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Abstract
Part I of this Note discusses a pending case, Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum, and
then gives a brief historical overview of the developing regard for the cultural integrity of nations.
Part II examines international convention as well as U.S. federal and common law principles as
they apply to pilfered cultural objects. Part III proposes that the creation of a national registry
of cultural objects, including a statute of limitations, is necessary. This Note concludes that a
national registry of cultural objects is needed to balance more equitably the legitmate concerns
of art-acquiring nations such as the United States with the concerns of art-rich nations, such as
Turkey, which have little control over the illegal taking and export of objects integral to their
cultural heritage.
THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL REGISTRY OF
CULTURAL OBJECTS
INTRODUCTION
It has been said that if all illegally exported cultural ob-
jects' were returned to their countries of origin, the museums
of the world would be virtually empty. 2 The moral argument
that all such objects should be repatriated has been articulated
1. For the purposes of this note, "cultural object" will be defined as it is in the
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S.
231, 10 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention]:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "cultural property"
means property which on religious or secular grounds, is specifically desig-
nated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, his-
tory, literature, art or science and which belongs to the following categories:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy,
and objects of palaeontological interest;
(b) Property relating to history, including the history of science and tech-
nology and military and social history, to the life of national leaders,
thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clandestine) or of
archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites
which have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptons, coins
and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, such as:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any
support and in any material (excluding industrial designs and
manufactured articles decorated by hand);
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any any material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publications of
special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in col-
lections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical in-
struments.
UNESCO Convention, 823 U.N.T.S. at 234-36, 10 I.L.M. at 289-90 (emphasis ad-
ded).
2. Shirey, Most Ancient Art Smuggled, Curator Says, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1973, at 42,
col. 1. John D. Cooney, the curator of ancient art of the Cleveland Museum of Art, is
quoted as saying: "[E]ven if I know it's hot, I can't be concerned about that. If the
museums in this country begin to send back all the smuggled material to their coun-
tries of origin, the museum walls would be bare." Id.; see also Shirey, Syrian Mosiac
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by many, but the solution is not so simple.' A current case
between the Republic of Turkey and The Metropolitan Mu-
seum of Art ("Metropolitan" or "Museum") typifies the prob-
lem of resolving disputes about cultural objects between art-
rich4 and art-acquiring5 nations.
Part I of this Note discusses a pending case, Republic of Tur-
key v. Metropolitan Museum,6 and then gives a brief historical
overview of the developing regard for the cultural integrity of
nations. Part II examines international conventions as well as
U.S. federal and common law principles as they apply to pil-
fered cultural objects. Part III proposes that the creation of a
national registry of cultural objects, including a statute of limi-
tations, is necessary. This Note concludes that a national reg-
istry of cultural objects is needed to balance more equitably
the legitimate concerns of art-acquiring nations such as the
United States with the concerns of art-rich nations such as Tur-
key, which have little control over the illegal taking and export
of objects integral to their cultural heritage.
I. THE PROBLEM OF THE LYDIAN OBJECTS
The current litigation between the Republic of Turkey and
the Metropolitan Museum of Art emphasizes the lack of clarity
in the law. The idea that the cultural heritage of other coun-
tries is deserving of international protection and respect has
developed very gradually.
Returned by the Newark Museum, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1974, at 16, col. I (attributing a
similar statement to the director of the Newark Museum).
3. For a full discussion of a legal argument as opposed to a moral argument, see
Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1881 (1985).
4. "Art-rich nations" is used to describe countries such as Turkey, Thailand, and
Mexico that are rich in cultural objects, especially archaeological objects. Such coun-
tries are likely to be economically underdeveloped, and therefore lack the resources
to regulate the export of their cultural heritage. 1 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW,
ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 63 (1987).
5. "Art-acquiring nations" is used to describe countries such as Great Britain,
the United States, and France that, while possessed of their own cultural heritage, are
likely to be importers of cultural objects. These countries are economically devel-
oped and able to regulate export of their own cultural objects. I J. MERRYMAN & A.
ELSEN, supra note 4.
6. Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, No. 87 Civ. 3750
(S.D.N.Y. filed June 3,1987).
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A. The Lydian Art Treasures
In June 1987, the Republic of Turkey filed suit against the
Metropolitan Museum of Art ("Metropolitan" or "Museum")
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. 7 The government of Turkey maintains that approx-
imately 250 objects, called by Turkey "Lydian Art Treasures"
and by the Metropolitan "Eastern Greek Treasures," were un-
lawfully excavated in the 1960s from burial mounds within
Turkey and then illegally exported.8 The Metropolitan argues
that Turkey's claim is stale and barred by the statute of limita-
tions and the doctrine of laches. 9
The Metropolitan purchased the pieces between 1966 and
1968 from a dealer in New York City and a foreign dealer lo-
cated in Switzerland.' 0 The Museum maintains that the New
York dealer was reputable and that he claimed legal title to the
objects." However, the Museum did not publicly announce
the purchase 12 and its catalogue lists many of the objects in
question only as "confidential" or "Greek."'" The Museum
briefly displayed a few pieces on two occasions.' 4 It was not
until 1984 that the Museum displayed fifty pieces and pub-
lished an exhibition catalogue of those fifty pieces.' 5 However,
about 200 objects have remained in storage since their acquisi-
7. Id.
8. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at
6-9, Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, No. 87 Civ. 3750 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Dec. 21, 1987) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Memorandum].
9. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at
2, Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, No. 87-3750 (S.D.N.Y. filed
July 1987) [hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum].
10. Id. at 3.
11. Pearson, Turkey Sues Metropolitan for Antiquities, INT'L. FOUND. ART RES. REPS.,
July 1987, at 6. The article quotes John Ross, manager for public information at the
Metropolitan: "The objects we think the Turks are claiming were purchased from a
reputable New York dealer, J.J. Klejman, in the 1960s and he represented to the
museum that he had legal claim to them." Id.
12. Id. at 6.
13. See The Met's Catalog-How Easy to Look for Stolen Art?, ME. ANTIQUE DIG., Jan.
1986, at 7a, quoted in INT'L FOUND. ART RES. REPS., July 1987, at 6.
14. Defendant's Affidavit at 4, Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of
Art, No. 87-3750 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 1987) (affidavit of Dietrich von Bothmer,
Department Head, Department of Greek and Roman Art, Metropolitan Museum of
Art).
15. Plaintiff's Affidavit No. 1 in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at
8, Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, No. 87 Civ. 3750 (S.D.N.Y.
filed July 1987) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Affidavit].
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tion. ' 6
New York State's three-year statute of limitations is trig-
gered only when the true owner has discovered the location of
the object, made a demand for its return, and had that demand
refused. 7 The Turkish government claims that it first officially
demanded that the Metropolitan return the objects in 1986
and that its suit is not stale.' 8 The Museum claims that Turkey
made several demands for repatriation as far back as the
1970s, which triggered the limitation period, thereby render-
ing Turkey's claim stale in 1986."9 The Museum also main-
tains that it has repeatedly requested specific information from
Turkey to prove Turkish ownership of the objects.2"
Turkey has a national patrimony law that vests ownership
of all archaeological objects located within Turkey in the state
and makes any export of them illegal. 2' But Turkey has had
great difficulty in proving ownership of the disputed objects
because they were never under its actual control. Because the
objects were taken from unexcavated tombs, Turkey did not
even know of their existence until after reports that they were
stolen.22 The only evidence relating the disputed objects to
Turkey was the empty tombs themselves and a few similar
items taken from native diggers who had broken into the
tombs. 23 Although Turkish law prohibits the export of such
objects, under general principles of international law illegal
export alone is not the equivalent of theft, 24 nor is the subse-
quent import into another country illegal.'
16. There are varying estimates of the number of objects involved. Deitrich von
Bothmer, curator of the Metropolitan's Greek and Roman collections, states that
there are 248. Defendant's Affidavit, supra note 14, at 2-3. As about 50 are on dis-
play, this leaves some 200 objects in the Museum's possession that are not on display.
Plaintiff's Affidavit, supra note 15, at 2-3.
17. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1162 (2d. Cir.
1982).
18. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 8, at 11-13.
19. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 9, at 3, 10-23.
20. See Pearson, supra note 11, at 6.
21. Turkey claims its ownership under a 1906 Turkish law that declares all its
antiquities to be property of the state. Plaintiff's Affidavit, supra note 15, at 3.
22. Plaintiff's Affidavit, supra note 15, at 6.
23. Id. at 4-5.
24. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 551 F.2d
52 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 918 (1979).
25. F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 501 (1973).
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Twenty years have passed since the Metropolitan acquired
the objects. Key witnesses are no longer available.26 Why the
Turkish government did not act more promptly to recover the
objects remains unclear. The fact that the Metropolitan did
not make the purchase public for nearly two decades raises
questions as well.
B. Historical Overview
1. "Legitimate" Plunder in War
The idea that a country's cultural heritage is deserving of
respect and protection developed very gradually. Ancient
Rome legitimized the plunder of the cultural property of de-
feated nations on the ground that a defeated nation returned
to a state of nature and its laws ceased to exist.27 The people,
wealth, and art of the defeated nation were simply the prizes of
war.
2 8
Later legal theories no longer accepted the fiction that de-
feat obliterated all of a nation's law.2 9 However, even into the
eighteenth century it was commonly accepted that everything
done against an enemy was lawful and that a conqueror had
unlimited rights over all property.3 0 In the later part of the
eighteenth century distinctions began to be made between le-
gitimate and illegitimate actions in war.A One theorist even
went so far as to condemn any destruction of a nation's cul-
26. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 9, at 34-35.
27. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 237-40 (1930). However, early Roman law also had
an interesting conception of objects. They were of two types,familia (all persons and
things of the household) and pecunia (the things of the field). M. MAuss, THE Girr 48
(1967). Within thefamilia there was no distinction between personam and rem. d. at
49. An object from within thefamilia was not just a pot as a commodity. Its exchange
carried with it obligations on the part of the receiver beyond the pecuniary considera-
tion involved in the exchange of things of the field. Id. at 51. Possessing an object
from within thefamilia placed the possessor in an inferior position to thefamilia spiri-
tually and morally as well as legally until the obligation was released by an agreed-
upon reciprocation. Id. at 53. The theft of such objects was more than economic. Id.
at 46-53. By analogy, archaeological objects, as part of the patrimony of a culture,
might be seen as involving more than money in their exchange. There are cultural,
scientific, moral, aesthetic, national, and international interests involved.
28. H. MAINE, supra note 27, at 240.
29. Id. at 239.
30. S. WILLIAMs, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF MOVEABLE
CULTURAL PROPERTY 5 (1978).
31. Id. at 5-6.
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tural monuments as barbaric. 2
During the Napoleonic wars, France justified its wholesale
appropriation of the cultural treasures of other states by claim-
ing to be the cultural center of Europe and therefore the most
appropriate repository of the heritage of those it defeated.3"
Apparently this argument seemed inadequate, even to France,
for it felt compelled to legitimize much of its taking by signed
treaty, particularly with the various states of Italy. 34 After the
defeat of Napoleon, the armistice contained no mention of the
confiscated cultural property that had found its way into the
museums and libraries of France. 5 This silence led the French
negotiators of the Convention of Paris to presume that the
misappropriated objects would find repose in France. 6 They
sought to have a clause inserted into the Convention to "guar-
antee the integrity of museums and libraries" of France. 7 The
clause was rejected and the treaties under which objects had
been removed were not recognized. 8 All states that had been
deprived of cultural property demanded its repatriation. 9
However, France did not return many of the objects.4" Some
were damaged during their return and others were simply
lost. 4 1
2. The Hague Convention: Protection and Respect
Later in the nineteenth century, legal theorists argued that
the plunder of cultural property ought to be prohibited in con-
ditions of war. 42 A clear distinction was made between thejus-
tiffed seizure or destruction of military property and the unjusti-
fied seizure or destruction of non-military property not within
32. Id. at 6.
33. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 7.
34. Graham, Protection and Reversion of Cultural Property, 21 INT'L LAw. 755, 758.
Treaties were made with Bologna, Palma, Milan, and even Pope Pius VI. Id. at 758
n.9 (1987).
35. Quynn, Art Confiscations of the Napoleonic Wars, 50 AM. HIST. REV. 437, 446
(1945).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 447.
38. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 8.
39. Quynn, supra note 35, at 456.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 15-18.
CULTURAL PROPERTY
"military necessity."' 43
The developing regard for cultural property in conditions
of war culminated in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Pro-
tection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
44
("Hague Convention"). In its preamble, the Hague Conven-
tion declares that cultural property is "part of the cultural heri-
tage of all mankind ' 45 and is thus deserving of "protection ' 46
and "respect ' 47 in conditions of war. This statement implies
that cultural property is not merely the patrimony of one par-
ticular nation. An invader is required to respect a country's
cultural heritage because that heritage is understood to be part
of all mankind's inheritance.
II. CULTURAL OBJECTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION AND U.S. LA W
The principle that cultural objects are part of an interna-
tional heritage deserving of protection and respect has proven
to be a far more elusive ideal when discussed outside the con-
text of war. 48 Although the League of Nations discussed pro-
posals for peacetime protection of cultural property, the dis-
cussion was abruptly ended by World War II.49 Not until the
1960s was UNESCO able to formulate an international agree-
ment for the peacetime protection of cultural objects.50
A. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
The most comprehensive multinational agreement on the
protection of cultural property in peacetime is the 1970
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Owner-
ship of Cultural Property5' ("UNESCO Convention").
While the UNESCO Convention speaks of the "in-
43. Id.
44. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, The Hague, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Conven-
tion].
45. Id. preamble, 249 U.N.T.S. at 240.
46. Id. art. 2, 249 U.N.T.S. at 242.
47. Id. art. 4, 249 U.N.T.S. at 242.
48. K. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST (1973).
49. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 21-22; see also Graham, supra note 34, at 764.
50. Graham, supra note 34, at 771.
51. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1.
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terchange of cultural property, '5 2 its provisions concern them-
selves primarily with restrictions on illicit movement. 53  It
makes almost no mention of means of promoting the licit 54
flow of cultural objects. Article 13(d) of the UNESCO Conven-
tion "recognize[s] the indefeasible right of each state party...
to classify and declare certain cultural property as inalienable
which should therefore ipsofacto not be exported." '55
Article 13 validated existing national patrimony laws of
some countries 56 and led some art-rich nations to enact legisla-
tion that declares all cultural property within a state's borders
to be property of the state.57 Some nations have made any ex-
port illegal,58 while others permit export in theory, but not in
fact. 59 It is primarily art-rich nations that are concerned with
the "illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural
property."
52. Id. preamble, 823 U.N.T.S. at 232, 10 I.L.M. at 289.
53. Apart from definitional and procedural articles the UNESCO Convention:
recognizes the harm of illicit flow and calls for repatriations, id. art. 2, 823 U.N.T.S.
at 236, 10 I.L.M. at 290; declares any import, export, or transfer of ownership con-
trary to the principles of the UNESCO Convention to be "illicit," id. art. 3, 823
U.N.T.S. at 236, 10 I.L.M. at 290; proposes the creation of national services for the
protection of cultural property, id. art. 5, 823 U.N.T.S. at 238, 10 I.L.M. at 290; pro-
poses an export certification requirement, id. art. 6, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at
290-91; proposes measures to prevent museums from acquiring illegally exported
objects, id. art. 7, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at 291; proposes penalties for viola-
tions of article 7, id. art. 8, 823 U.N.T.S. at 242, 10 I.L.M. at 291; calls for a "con-
certed" effort by State Parties to restrict international commerce in "specific objects"
in cases where a country's patrimony is injeapordy, id. art. 9, 823 U.N.T.S. at 242, 10
I.L.M. at 291; proposes to obligate "antique dealers" to "register" cultural property
and to sanction those who fail to do so, id. art. 10, 823 U.N.T.S. at 242, 10 I.L.M. at
291; declares any export under compulsion arising from the occupation of a country
to be "illicit," id. art. 11, 823 U.N.T.S. at 242, 10 I.L.M. at 291; and declares the right
of nations to declare certain property inalienable, id. art. 13, 823 U.N.T.S. at 244, 10
I.L.M. at 291-92.
54. Licit means allowable and not just "legal." 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
1615 (compact ed. 1971). Licit is used to make the point that something may be illicit
but still legal. For example, international law does not recognize illegal export from
one country as making subsequent import into a second country illegal. As far as the
second country is concerned the import may be perfectly legal. F. MANN, supra note
25, at 501.
55. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, art. 13(d), 823 U.N.T.S. at 244, 10
I.L.M. at 292.
56. For example, Turkey, which updated its national patrimony law in 1973. See
L. DUBOFF, DESKBOOK OF ART LAw 1064 (1977).
57. P. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 39 (1983).
58. Id. at 38-39.
59. Id. at 43.
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By contrast, art-acquiring nations have been the benefi-
ciaries of the illicit flow. Of more than fifty signatories to the
UNESCO Convention, only two are so-called art-acquiring na-
tions-the United States and Canada.6 ° Thus, the UNESCO
Convention has not proven to be especially effective in mediat-
ing points of difference between art-rich nations and art-ac-
quiring nations.
The shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention not only
inhibit any licit interchange of cultural property but actually
promote illicit trade.6 Unless art-acquiring nations are willing
to assist in stemming illicit trade, alternatives that would pro-
mote a licit flow stand little chance of success.
B. Nationalism Versus Internationalism
The efforts to protect cultural objects reveal tension be-
tween two competing notions of ownership of cultural objects;
that is, between the idea that these objects are part of the na-
tional patrimony of one country exclusively, and the idea that
they are really part of the cultural heritage of all mankind. The
Metropolitan, for example, is not entirely mistaken when it re-
fers to the Lydian objects as "Eastern Greek"; they are the cre-
ations of a culture related more closely to ancient Greece than
to modern Turkey.62 The location of the objects within the
current borders of Turkey is as much an accident of history as
it is a source of Turkish national pride. The objects are rem-
nants of peoples who were not simply "Turkish. '63
Yet the argument for cultural internationalism becomes
self-serving when it is used to justify the one-way movement of
objects from economically developing, art-rich nations to
wealthy, art-acquiring nations. Those who profit economically
often are not the art-rich nations, but third-party dealers who
60. The United States and Canada are the only art-acquiring nations to actually
subscribe to the UNESCO Convention. I J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 4, at
96.
61. P. BATOR, supra note 57, at 41-43. Bator discusses the problem of broad and
unenforeceable export regulation as a factor in continuous illegal trade. With strong
demand and no legal way of satisfying the demand, an illegal market is inevitable. Id.
62. As a trade center of great wealth Lydia was at different times connected to
Greek, Roman, and Persian Empires. 17 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 880 (1984).
However, they are specifically described as "non-Greek people." Id.
63. Id.
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are themselves from developed nations.64
The tension between art-acquiring nations, who are likely
to be economicallly developed, and art-rich nations, most
likely to be underdeveloped, is reversed by the dispute over
the meaning of the phrase "heritage of mankind." The self-
interest evident in cultural internationalism has its counterpart
in the dispute concerning the allocation of natural resources.
That resources should be shared suddenly becomes less self-
evident when applied to natural resources located on the
ocean floor65 or on the Moon.6 6
C. United States Reservations and Understandings
The United States recognized the UNESCO Convention
in a manner that preserved its interests as an acquiring nation
and greatly limited the application of the Convention. The
U.S. Senate ratified the Convention in 1972 subject to a reser-
vation and six understandings. 67 The United States under-
stood article 13(d), calling for repatriation of illegally exported
objects, as applying only to objects removed from their coun-
tries of origin after the Convention entered into force in the
United States.68 The Convention was also understood not to
require nations to establish national control over private insti-
tutions such as museums. 69 The United States further under-
stood that actions for repatriation must be brought under the
laws of the country where the objects have been taken. 70 The
nation demanding return must provide the "necessary proofs
of ownership" as defined by the country where the objects are
found.7 '
The dispute between the Metropolitan and Turkey over
64. For example, the sale by a New York dealer to Norton Simon of the
Swapuram Natraja for US$900,000. The government of India sued for the objects'
return and settled out of court. L. DUBOFF, supra note 56, at 109-12.
65. Goldie, A Note on Some Diverse Meanings of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 10
SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & CoM. 69, 75 (1983).
66. Note, The Commercial Space Launch Act: America's Response to the Moon Treaty, 10
FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 763 (1987).
67. United States Ratification of UNESCO Convention, 118 CONG. REC. 27,925
(1972).
68. Id. at 27,925.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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ownership of the Lydian objects does not fall within the
UNESCO Convention as it is understood by the United States.
First, the objects entered the United States before the
UNESCO Convention was enacted. 72 Second, the U.S. under-
standing does not require any governmental control over the
actions of a private museum such as the Metropolitan. 73 Fi-
nally, Turkey might have great difficulty in establishing itself as
the "rightful owner" of objects that it has been unable even to
describe. A Turkish claim of national ownership might not sat-
isfy a definition of ownership under U.S. law.74
D. The Implementation Act
Because of the understanding that the Convention is not
self-executing, it did not come into force in the United States
until the enactment of enabling legislation some ten years after
ratification. The enabling legislation is known as the Conven-
tion on Cultural Property Implementation Act 75 ("Implemen-
tation Act").
The Implementation Act not only codifies the reservation
and understandings of the ratification, but also reflects the po-
sition of the United States when it participated in the creation
of the UNESCO Convention itself. For example, section 308
of the Implementation Act deals specifically with stolen prop-
erty, but requires that a stolen object be "documented as ap-
pertaining to the inventory of a museum or religious or secular
public monument or similar institution. '76 Objects, like the
Lydian treasures, taken by illegal excavation from a tomb are
not documented. Thus under the Implementation Act, a coun-
72. As the thefts of the tombs occured in the 1960s, they precede the 1970
UNESCO Convention, the U.S. ratification in 1972, and the Implementation Act of
1983.
73. See United States Ratification of UNESCO Convention, 118 CONG. REC. at
27,925.
74. As possession is the primary incident of common law ownership, a claim for
objects never under the actual control of the claimant, who cannot even describe
what he owns, would be problematic. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434
(1920) (stating that "possession is the beginning of ownership" and that a state claim
to ownership of wild birds, in no one's possession, was not supportable).
75. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-446,
96 Stat. 2350 (1983) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1982)).
76. 19 U.S.C. § 2607.
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try whose unopened tombs are looted has no claim under sec-
tion 308.
Section 303 of the Act" effects article 9 of the UNESCO
Convention, which is a crisis provision seeking to prevent "ir-
remedial injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting
state."78 It applies specifically to archaeological materials.79
Because it deals only with prospective import controls, it
would be of no use to Turkey in its case against the Metropoli-
tan. However, to make use of section 303, an art-rich nation
would first have to apply to the President of the United
States.80 The President would then have to consider a number
of factors: first, whether a nation's archaeological materials
were really in jeopardy from pillage;8 second, whether a na-
tion had taken "measures consistent with the Convention to
protect its cultural patrimony";82 third, whether the applica-
tion of import restrictions by the United States, in conjunction
with other states having a significant import of the same ob-
jects, would be of "substantial benefit in deterring a serious
situation of pillage";8 3 fourth, whether less drastic restrictions
were not available; 84 and fifth, whether such restrictions pro-
moted cultural interchange.85 If these conditions were satis-
fied, the President could apply import controls.
However, there is another condition to section 303. The
President may not apply import restrictions if other nations
having a "significant import trade" in the requesting nation's
cultural objects do not also implement restrictions within a
reasonable time or do not do so satisfactorily.86 In such cases
the President "shall suspend" import restrictions.8 7
Section 304 of the Implementation Act permits the United
77. Id. § 2602.
78. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, art. 9, 823 U.N.T.S. at 242, 10 I.L.M. at
291.
79. 19 U.S.C. § 2602.
80. Id. § 2602(a)(1).
81. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act § 303 (a)(l)(A), 19
U.S.C. § 2602(a)(l)(A).
82. Id. § 303(a)(l)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(l)(B).
83. Id. § 303(a)(1)(C)(i), 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(i).
84. Id. § 303(a)(l)(C)(ii), 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(ii).
85. Id. § 303(a)(l)(D), 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(l)(D).
86. Id. § 303(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2602(c)(1).
87. Id. § 303(d), 19 U.S.C. § 2602(d).
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States to implement unilateral import restrictions in an emer-
gency situation. 8 Emergency restrictions can be applied only
on three conditions: first, that the objects to be restricted were
"a newly discovered type of material" recognized as coming
from a "site of high cultural significance"; second, that the pil-
lage "is or threatens to be of crisis proportions"; and third,
that the import restrictions applied by the U.S. must "in whole,
or in part, reduce the incentive for such pillage." 9
D. The National Stolen Property Act
Having fallen through the cracks of the UNESCO Conven-
tion and the Implementation Act, a nation such as Turkey
might look to other United States law for the return of objects.
Under the National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA"), a person
who transports goods valued at US$5000 or more in interstate
commerce, "knowing the same to have been stolen, converted
or taken by fraud" or to receive, conceal, store, sell or dispose
of such goods, is guilty of a federal crime.90
1. United States v. Hollinshead
The NSPA was largely a theoretical threat to art dealers
and museums until the 1970s. If a nation is unable to locate or
describe an object in detail, it is next to impossible to charge
someone with theft under the. NSPA or to sue for its return on
a civil claim. In 1974, however, in United States v. Hollinshead, a
California art dealer was convicted of the theft of a Mayan stela
from Guatemala. 9' Although the case began as a civil suit in
California state court for the return of the object, before the
trial the Federal Bureau of Investigation seized the stela, and
the defendants were charged with transporting and conspiring
to transport stolen goods in interstate and foreign com-
merce.92 The dealers were convicted on the strength of pho-
tographic evidence and expert testimony on Guatemalan law.93
88. Id. § 304, 19 U.S.C. § 2603.
89. Id. § 304(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2603(a).
90. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
91. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974). For discussion
of this case see, e.g., P. BATOR, supra note 57, at 68-70; L. DUBOFF, supra note 56, at
91-99.
92. P. BATOR, supra note 57, at 70.
93. Id.
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2. United States v. McClain
Three years later the possibility of using the NSPA against
those who deal in stolen cultural objects was significantly ex-
panded. United States v. McClain 94 enunciated the principle that
"exportation constitutes a sufficient act of conversion to con-
stitute theft," but only when the object is illegally exported
from a country that has enacted a national patrimony law.95
Because an object is "owned" by its nation of origin, any ex-
port without official approval would be an act of theft. Appel-
lants argued against the court's reliance on Mexican law96 that
grants Mexico property rights in things that, in Anglo-Ameri-
can understanding, are private property, the taking of which
requires compensation.9 7 While there have not been subse-
quent convictions on the McClain principle, the threat of crimi-
nal liability, often raised by U.S. Customs, has virtually halted
the flow of cultural objects from Central and South America.98
McClain made U.S. dealers, collectors, and museums vulnera-
ble to liability for objects that may have been legally possessed
by an individual in their country of origin, but whose export is
deemed illegal because of property rights imposed by the
country of export.99
94. United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
918 (1979); United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 551 F.2d
52 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
95. McClain, 545 F.2d at 1003 n.33.
96. Id. For discussion of this case, see L. DUBOFF, supra note 56, at 79-91; P.
BATOR, supra note 57, at 70-78; 1 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 4, at 118-24;
McAlee, The McClain Case, Customs, and Congress, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 813
(1983).
97. See P. BATOR, supra note 57, at 72. Ironically, the United States once itself
acted to take property without compensation--during the Civil War. While justified
as a "necessity of war," the freeing of slaves without compensation to their "owners"
violated the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution-but only if those
enslaved were considered in law to be mere chattels. Of course the issue involved
much more than the sanctity of the private property rights of slaveholders. See, e.g.,
Fladeland, Compensated Emancipation: A Reected Alternative, 17 J. S. HIsT. 169, 169-86
(1951); Lucie, Confiscation: Constitutional Crossroads, 23 CIv. WAR HIST. 307, 307-21
(1977).
98. McGill, Senators To Weigh Limit on Claims to Stolen Art, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1986, at C19, col. 1. See generally McAlee, supra note 96. McAlee describes how Mc-
Clain has been construed by the U.S. Customs Service to warrant seizures of artifacts
from Central and South America, effectively freezing the importing of these objects
into the United States. Id.
99. P. BATOR, supra note 57, at 75.
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3. Proposed Legislation
Since McClain, observers have argued that even legitimate
importing has ceased and that the flow of objects has simply
been diverted to other acquiring nations such as France and
Japan. 00
As a result, in 1985, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan pro-
posed legislation to overturn McClain by amending the
NSPA.' ° 1 The amendment would have excluded museums
from liability that purchased "archaeological or ethnological
materials" when the objects were taken from a foreign country
with a national property law which made export illegal.'l 2 Sup-
porters of the proposal argued that McClain recognized a con-
cept of property alien to the common law.10 3 According to
these lawmakers, the Implementation Act was the appropriate
legal framework for controlling the illicit trade in cultural ob-
jects. 104
Although the amendment was never passed, these argu-
ments persist. However, there is no justification for U.S. legis-
lation that extinguishes all rights and interests of art-rich na-
tions in their cultural objects without providing those nations
an opportunity to assert their interests, even if those interests
differ from common law understandings of ownership.
McClain is not entirely at odds with Anglo-American theo-
ries of property. Under the common law, property is the ag-
gregate of rights that are guaranteed and protected by the gov-
ernment.10 5 Public property is "not restricted to the dominion
of a private person."10 6 Private ownership is understood to be
the "unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to
dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it and
to exclude everyone else from interfering with it."1 07 Yet, even
Anglo-American understandings of private ownership do not
100. 43 CONG. Q 1154 (June 15, 1985).
101. S. 605, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see also McGill, supra note 98, at C19,
col. 1 (discussing the proposed bill).
102. S. 605, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
103. 131 CONG. REC. S2612 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1985) (statement of Sen. Moyni-
han).
104. 43 CONG. Q 1154 (June 15, 1985).
105. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 635 (5th ed. 1979).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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extend to every object that might conceivably be owned. U.S.
law recognizes that there are rights and interests that attach to
some things and outweigh the rights of a private possessor. 0 8
In the interests of society as a whole, certain things are simply
not treated as chattels. For example, while there is certainly a
market for bodily organs, federal law prohibits their sale in in-
terstate commerce.' 0 9 Endangered species also come under
protection because of interests other than those of the market-
place. 1 0 Federal law recognizes that there are more than the
interests of buyers and sellers at stake in such transactions.
The proponents of the NSPA amendment argued that
preventing illicit trade in cultural objects was the purpose of
the Implementation Act. However, the Implementation Act
was so carefully drafted as to be of little use when dealing with
undocumented objects, the theft of which renders documenta-
tion impossible."I' The Act's provisions for undocumented
objects apply only in situations of massive pilfering, and not to
individual cases, and then only after an approval process sub-
ject to numerous conditions." 2
4. Commercial Considerations
McClain should not be interpreted as supporting a prohi-
bition of the purchase and sale of cultural objects. There are
real benefits to ascribing market value to such objects. The
existence of a market for cultural objects increases their distri-
bution and leads to their being treated with great care." 3
Many art-rich nations are unable to display, preserve, or even
to document their vast holdings."t 4 Often the objects are less
valued in their country of origin than they are internation-
ally."' 5 In many cases the objects are one of many of the same
108. See infra notes 109-10.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (Supp. III 1985).
110. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
111. See Convention on Cultural Property Act § 308, 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (1982).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 76-90.
113. See IJ. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 4, at 62-64.
114. Schumacher, Peru's Rich Antiquities Crumbling in Museums, N.Y. Times, Aug.
15, 1983, at C14, col. 1.
115. de Varine, The Rape and Plunder of Cultures: An Aspect of Deterioration of the
Terms of Cultural Trade Between Nations, 139 MUSEUM 152 (1983), reprinted in IJ. MER-
RYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 4, at 46-50.
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or similar type." 6 All these factors make distribution of cul-
tural objects outside of art-rich nations desirable. When ob-
jects are pilfered, the art-rich nations receive nothing in "ex-
change." A local dealer may have sold an object for profit.
But the significant profits in the sale of an object of "doubtful
provenance" ' "l 7 and the objects themselves are often ex-
changed between parties in acquiring nations." 8
5. Replevin and Repose
Most cases involving stolen cultural property concern the
return of the object rather than the criminal prosecution of
possessors or demands for compensation. " 9 These cases are
in the nature of equitable replevin, which seeks the return of
objects that are unique and irreplaceable. 20
A good-faith purchaser has defenses to such a claim. It is
considered reasonable to require a true owner to act on his
claim within a reasonable period of time.' 21 This requirement
protects a good-faith purchaser from delay that might make it
impossible to recover his purchase price. 122  A timely claim
116. Schumacher, supra note 114. In this article, a Peruvian archaeologist dis-
cusses the advantages of selling duplicates of cultural objects to generate income for
preservation. Id.
117. "Doubtful provenance" is an art dealer's euphemism for origins a dealer
would rather were not determined. See comments of J.J. Klejman, quoted in Canady,
Met Proud of Rare Greek Pitcher, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1983 at 24, col. 1. "Mr. Klejman
says that the Greek collection was his last purchase in the field of classical antiquity by
the old (and still largely current) code by which a work of art may be 'legitimately
purchased' and 'legitimately sold' under such conditions as are known when its prov-
enance cannot be specifically demonstrated as illegal." Id. Oddly, the article con-
taining Mr. Klejman's statement was used in the affidavit of Dietrich von Bothmer to
defend the Metropolitan Museum of Art's claim to the Lydian objects, and is in refer-
ence to them. See Defendant's Affidavit, supra note 14, Exhibit A.
118. Canady, supra note 117. According to the article, J.J. Klejman stated that
the Lydian objects were obtained from "ignorant men who had received the works at
fourth or fifth hand, who themselves did not know the places of origin and could not
distinguish the good pieces from the masses of junk' they also offered." Id.
119. Hollinshead, for example, was initiated by Guatemala as a civil action to re-
cover the Mayan stela, not as a criminal indictment. See supra note 91 and accompa-
nying text.
120. Replevin is an action for the return of goods or chattels. D. DOBBS, REME-
DIES 399 (1973). Turkey maintains that its claim is equitable rather than legal be-
cause it seeks the return of unique and irreplaceable objects rather than mere fungi-
ble goods. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 8, at 13 n.6.
121. See Dalsis v. Hill, 424 F. Supp. 784, 788 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
122. Id.
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also serves to ensure the availability of evidence and witnesses
to the transaction. 2 3
To protect good-faith purchasers from stale claims, stat-
utes of limitations, or repose laws, are enacted to set a time
limit within which a claim must be brought. 24 If the statutory
period of years has passed, the good-faith purchaser has ob-
tained good title by default on the part of the true owner. 25
State jurisdictions have differing criteria for their limita-
tion statutes. One important distinction is the event used to
define the point at which the statute of limitations begins to
run. In some states a limitation statute may be triggered at the
time an object is first stolen. 26 Other states determine the
statute to be triggered when the object first comes into the
hands of a good faith purchaser. 27 Still others take the view
that the statute is triggered when the owner discovers or
should have discovered the location of the object. 12  Turkey's
claim against the Metropolitan comes under the New York
rule.' 29 New York adopts a minority view; its limitation statute
is triggered only when the true owner has discovered the loca-
tion of the object, made a demand for its return, and had that
demand refused. 30
There was a 1985 proposal in the New York State Assem-
bly 13 for a repose law applying specifically to cultural objects.
The proposal did not become law because it was perceived to
be an attempt to shield U.S. possessors from claims rather than
123. Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 730 (2d Cir. 1977).
124. New York's limitation for an action to recover a chattel is three years. N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 214(3) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
125. Priester v. Millman, 55 A.2d 540, 543-44 (Pa. Super. 1947). See generally 51
AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 90 (1970).
126. Jackson v. American Credit Bureau, 531 P.2d 932, 934 (Ariz. App. 1975);
see also Weil, Repose, INT'L FOUND. FOR ART REs. REPS., Aug.-Sept. 1987, at 6-7 (dis-
cussing differing determinations of when limitation statutes begin to run as they ap-
ply to stolen art).
127. Christensen Grain, Inc. v. Garden City Coop. Equity Exch., 192 Kan. 785,
787, 391 P.2d 81, 83 (1964); Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run
Against Action for Conversion of Property by Theft, 79 A.L.R.3d 851 (1977).
128. O'Keefe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 493, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (1980).
129. Menzel v. List, 22 A.D.2d 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1964).
130. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1162 (2d. Cir.
1982).
131. 11462-A New York State Assembly (June 11, 1986); see McGill, supra note
98, at C19, col. I (New York State repose act suggested by Metropolitan Museum of
Art).
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an effort to strike a balance between possessors and owners. 13 2
The proposal provided that a limitation period was triggered
when the object came into the hands of a good-faith purchaser,
thus requiring the owner to race against the clock to try to find
a listing in a museum catalogue, periodical, or other such pub-
lication.' It is unclear how an art-rich nation was to search
for objects held by private collectors or dealers.
Apart from beating the clock, a plaintiff in an action in re-
plevin may have to defeat the defense of laches. The plaintiff
may not prevail when the defendant has been prejudiced by
delay on the part of the plaintiff in bringing the action. 34 This
defense presumes that the plaintiff was in a position to make a
demand and delayed without justification.'3 5 The Metropoli-
tan has raised this defense against Turkey.' 36 However, Tur-
key has asserted that it could not have made a demand prior to
1986 because the Metropolitan refused to supply information
sufficient to establish that Turkey had a claim at all. 1 7
6. Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art
While the suit between Turkey and the Metropolitan is yet
to be resolved, it serves to point out the problems faced by
both parties in a dispute over cultural objects.
Nearly twenty years ago the Metropolitan purchased nu-
merous objects from a reputable dealer who is no longer avail-
able. 38  The Museum would not be able to recover the
purchase price if it is required to surrender the objects. 39 It
has not received a satisfactory description of the objects in
question proving they were the property of the government of
Turkey. 40 Evidence as to the purchases must be recon-
structed after a hiatus of nearly twenty years. What the Metro-
politan perceives as demands and refusals, triggering a statute
of limitations, are seen by Turkey as mere requests for infor-
132. See N.Y. Times, July 29, 1986, at C14, col. 3.
133. 11462-A New York State Assembly (June 11, 1986).
134. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
135. Id.
136. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 9, at 32-36.
137. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 8, at 11-21.
138. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 9, at 34-35.
139. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 9, at 35.
140. Pearson, supra note 11, at 6.
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mation prior to demands.' 4 '
Turkey has not been able to determine what objects were
taken because it never knew exactly what was in the tombs; the
objects were undocumented and could not have been docu-
mented because the tombs were never excavated by archaeolo-
gists.' 42 Now that the site has been looted, obtaining informa-
tion that might have been gathered by a careful excavation is
no longer possible. 4 3 Objects of great economic value have
been taken from Turkey without its permission and without
compensation. 44 Neither the people of Turkey nor the many
visitors to the Metropolitan have access to most of the ob-
jects. "'45 Turkey's requests to the U.S. State Department for
information about the Metropolitan's purchases were not an-
swered because the Metropolitan is not under the control of
the State Department. 46 In Turkey's view requests for infor-
mation from the Metropolitan were never satisfactorily an-
swered. 14
7
III. NATIONAL REGISTRY
If the Implementation Act were amended to require regis-
tration of cultural objects, many of the problems typified by
the litigation between the Metropolitan and the Republic of
Turkey could be resolved.
Registration itself would not be particularly difficult. Ob-
jects, the date of purchase, and the source could be as readily
described in a national register as they are in museum cata-
logues. 4 1 If the Metropolitan had purchased objects listed in
a national registry, it would not be subject to litigation some
141. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 9, at 11-13.
142. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 8, at 6-7.
143. 1 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 60, at 54.
144. The objects are said to be worth US$1.7 million. Lowenthal, Met Moves to
Dismiss Turkey's Suit, INT'L FOUND. ART REs. REPS., Aug.-Sept. 1987, at 5.
145. Accessibility is one of the arguments made for art as an international patri-
mony. Merryman, supra note 3, at 1920-21. This interest is not served when 200
objects remain in the basement of the Metropolitan after 20 years.
146. United States Ratification of UNESCO Convention, 118 CONG. REC. 27,925
(1972); see also Plaintiff's Affidavit, supra note 21, at 16-17 (detailing Turkey's request
and the response of the State Department).
147. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 8, at 17, 20-24.
148. K. MEYER, supra note 48, at 167-68. Meyer points out that Wall Street re-
quires rules of disclosure, while museums do not. Id.
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twenty years after the purchase. If Turkey had the opportunity
to search such a registry and did not have the burden of find-
ing concealed objects, it could have been in communication
with the Metropolitan and made a claim within a reasonable
time.
Registration of cultural objects could also serve as a war-
ranty of title from the seller. 149 If a registered object is found
to have been stolen, a purchaser could be guaranteed a return
of the purchase price for the length of time the limitation stat-
ute runs. In the existing case the Metropolitan is at risk of los-
ing the objects without compensation from the seller.150
When the true owner is an art-rich nation, limited in re-
sources, it seems patently unfair to require that it be alert to
the varying time periods and triggering conditions of U.S. state
laws, that it diligently search the periodicals, catalogues, and
exhibitions of every institution, and expect it to have a reason-
able chance of making a claim before the clock runs out. It
would be more fair to couple any repose act with a registration
provision, requiring a purchaser to list the object in a readily
accessible public registry before he is able to benefit from any
time limitation on claims. Moreover, a reasonably short limita-
tion period would avoid prejudicial delay to a possessor. If
Turkey had made a claim against the Metropolitan's purchase
within a certain period of time, defined by a statute of limita-
tions, witnesses and documents would have been more readily
available. Purchasers would also be assured that once the ob-
ject has been listed for the requisite period, the object would
be theirs without fear of litigation as to ownership.
By registering cultural objects, art-acquiring nations
would be recognizing, rather than avoiding, the interests of
art-rich nations. Art-rich nations might be more willing to
grant long term loans of objects if the listing of the objects
were known to guarantee title. Turkey, for example, has stated
its willingness to lend its objects to other countries, but is re-
luctant to do so under the present circumstances.' 5' The will-
149. The Metropolitan argues that the warranty provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code apply, and that under U.C.C. § 2-725 (1977) the four-year statute of
limitations on a warranty of title has expired. See Defendant's Memorandum, supra
note 9, at 35-36.
150. Id.
151. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 8, at 6 n.2.
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ingness of an art-acquiring nation to share information about
cultural objects and to act affirmatively to return misappropri-
ated objects might promote the sharing of the objects them-
selves.
Art-rich nations might be encouraged to list their most
valued objects on a U.S. registry to serve as notice of their
ownership to any potential U.S. purchaser and activate section
304 of the Implementation Act.'
Furthermore, the registry would protect not only art-rich
nations, but also U.S. owners of cultural objects. Both are
plagued by thefts. 5 3 A listing of private U.S. owners' holdings
in a national registry would protect against illegal dealings in
these objects as well. 154
As claims arise, a balancing of the interests of both posses-
sors and owners would be encouraged. National and interna-
tional interests would be served. For example, if a museum
were required to return an object it could stipulate that the
object must be be adequately preserved and displayed in its
country of origin. 55 A museum might be permitted to retain
the item on loan for an extended period, with title remaining
in the country of origin.'56 Or, in exchange for the return of
the objects, a possessor might be offered other objects, or an
opportunity to work with the art-rich nation in new excava-
tions. In addition, a claim for repatriation could be released in
exchange for compensation or offers of assistance in docu-
menting or preserving the holdings.
152. 19 U.S.C. § 2603 (1982).
153. See generally INT'L FOUND. ART RES. REps. This periodical lists art and cul-
tural objects stolen from museums, collectors, and galleries in the United States and
throughout the world.
154. Id.
155. This would serve to further the interests in art as an international patri-
mony. Merryman, supra note 3, at 1916-17.
156. Such a loan might be analogous to the common law concept of trusts,
wherein title resides in one party and the benefits accrue to another. If art-rich na-
tions retain title while objects resided in the United States, for example, the interna-
tional interests of preservation and accessibility would be served without extinguish-
ing the source country's relation to the objects. The objects might one day be re-
turned when international interests could realistically be served. Or, the objects
could be part of worldwide exhibitions.
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CONCLUSION
There is no greater curse to be found in this life than sharp practice
masquerading as intelligence; for it is from this that countless appar-
ent conflicts arise between expediency and moral good. In fact there
are few people who would refrain from doing wrong, if they were as-
sured that no punishment or even knowledge of the deed would result.
Cicero 157
It is a peculiar morality that, in the interest of protecting
the cultural heritage of all mankind, condones the pilfering of
cultural objects by providing them a haven in an art-acquiring
nation while ignoring the claims of art-rich nations from which
they were taken. It is even more odd to think that by virtue of
being the sole possessor of an object, the possessor is more
cultured. 58 Culture is not benefitted by assertions of exclusive
ownership of objects, but rather by the sharing of the ob-
jects. 59 Pilfering by art-acquiring nations and hoarding by art-
rich nations defeats culture.
To further mankind's appreciation of its cultural heritage,
cultural objects and information about those objects should be
made widely available. The interests of art-rich nations can be
well served by the display and preservation of objects in an-
other country. Respect for another country is increased when
its heritage is better known. The interests of acquiring nations
are served when they offer to share information about objects
and seek ways to promote sharing of them because art-rich na-
tions, which would benefit from an exchange, are more likely
to exchange willingly. Respect for the objects is directly re-
lated to respect for peoples whose past may be more closely
linked to the objects.' 60
The United States is in a unique position as an acquiring
nation to promote the licit flow of cultural objects. Giving art-
157. CICERO, ON MORAL OBLIGATION III, 17, 72 J. Higginbotham trans. 1967).
158. Cf. K. MEYER, supra note 48, at 187-97. Meyer discusses the motivations,
noble and otherwise, of collectors and museums in their passion for acquisition.
159. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 201-02.
160. See generally L. HYDE, THE GiFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF
PROPERTY (1983). Hyde makes an argument that exchanges involving art and bodily
organs are not the same as commodity exchanges. The essence of a commodity ex-
change is the extinguishing of all rights and interests to an object once it is trans-
ferred, whereas a gift exchange, as Hyde describes it, creates bonds between the
giver and receiver. The bonds are strengthened rather than extinguished by recipro-
cation.
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rich nations an opportunity to settle equitably claims to objects
of doubtful provenance would be a positive step in affirming
the principle that such objects are to be shared as part of an
international heritage. If the United States wishes to en-
courage other nations to look beyond their nationalist interests
we must do so ourselves.
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* J.D. candidate, 1989, Fordham University.
